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Abstract: When a utility function is state-dependent, ex ante preferences for acts cannot
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1 Introduction
In the subjective expected utility (SEU) paradigm, subjective state probabilities are elicited
through ex ante preferences (i.e., preferences before uncertainties are resolved) for acts, which
are mappings from the state space into decision outcomes. Savage (1954) related subjective
likelihood judgments to ex ante preferences to drive unique subjective state probabilities. On
the other hand, Anscombe and Aumann (1963) obtained unique subjective state probabilities
as scaling constants. Since preferences are assumed to be state-independent, those scaling
constants turn out to represent induced likelihood judgements as in Savages framework.
However, when preferences are state-dependent, their approaches do not work to elicit unique
subjective state probabilities.
It has been argued that separability of utility and subjective state probabilities may
be of no signicance when utility is state-dependent. For identifying unique probability in
the literature, however, several exogenous assumptions are devised to invoke information
other than observable choice (e.g., see Wakker and Zank, 1999, and Drèze and Rustichini,
2004, for detailed surveys and discussion). Drèze and Rustichini grouped approaches for
the identication into three categories: hypothetical preferences, moral hazard, and (event-
) conditional preferences. The rst two categories are concerned with ex ante preferences,
while the last assumes that the decision maker has preferences for acts conditional on di¤erent
events (or states).
This paper proposes another attempt to separate utility and subjective probability. Un-
like those approaches, we shall allow for two primitives for the decision makers subjective
judgments. In addition to ex ante preferences, we introduce ex post strength-of-preferences
for state-contingent decision outcomes. Although state-conditional preferences are induced
by ex post strength-of-preferences, we do not require that the decision maker has ex post
preferences for outcomes in di¤erent states. Instead, we shall assume that strength-of-
preferences at one state can be introspectively comparable to strength-of-preferences at other
state.
While the notion of strength-of-preference has been criticized in the literature because
of its unobservable nature of judgments, there have been many attempts to operationalize
in decision analysis (e.g., see von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, and Farquhar and Keller,
1989 for discussions of measurement methodologies, and Butler et. al., 2014 for a recent
experimental study). To the best of my knowledge, Sarin (1982) was the only attempt
to extend the domain of strength-of-preferences to decision making under uncertainty. He
showed conditions under which a (state-independent) utility function in a SEU framework
with nite states can be legitimately interpreted to measure ex antestrength-of-preferences
between acts, including decision outcomes identied with constant acts.
Observe that our application of strength-of-preferences in the SEU framework is quite
di¤erent from Sarins. We apply two well known utility representations of ex ante preferences
and ex post strength-of-preferences in our set-up. The main contribution of the paper is to
discover how those two representations are consistently combined to obtain unique subjective
probabilities as scaling constants.
A legitimacy of interpreting those constants as subjective probabilities may be demon-
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strated by an example. Suppose that the decision maker is concerned with her health states,
bad or good health, and her nal wealth levels. If she will not make any action now, she
knows that her wealth level will be wb if her health will become bad, and wg otherwise. Now
she is o¤ered to select one of two acts: one is to make her wealth increased by amount b if
her health turns out to be bad, and otherwise unchanged from no action, and another is the
other way around from the former act, i.e., to increase wealth by amount g if her health
will be good, and otherwise unchanged from no action. Suppose that preference intensity
for a situation in which the decision makers wealth wb at bad health can be increased by
amount b is judged to be equal to preference intensity for a situation in which her wealth
wg at healthy state can be increased by amount g. Then if she judges that the two acts are
indi¤erent, then it may be natural to infer that her likelihood judgement about the occur-
rence of each health state would be equally likely. Of course, if she prefers the former act to
the latter, we may conclude that bad health is judged to be more likely than good health.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce two axiom systems: one is
for ex ante preferences and another for ex post strength-of-preferences. Section 3 presents
ex ante-ex post consistency axiom and the main representation theorem which combines two
utility representations of ex ante preferences and ex post strength-of-preferences to yield
state dependent subjective expected utility. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Ex Ante and Ex Post Preferences
Let S = fs1; : : : ; sng be a nite set of states. Exactly one state is true and other states
are false. The decision maker does not know ex ante which state is true. An act is a
function from S into the real line R. Let X be a set of acts for which, for every si 2 S,
Xi = ff (si) : f 2 Xg is a real interval. Thus X can be identied with a rectangular subset
X1  Xn of Rn through the mappings f ! (f (s1) ; : : : ; f (sn)). Therefore, an act will be
identied with a real vector x 2 Rn, bold faced letters, whose i-component will be xi 2 Xi,
i.e., x = (x1; : : : ; xn). For any act x 2 X, an act whose i-component xi is replaced by some
i 2 Xi will be denoted by ix. In what follows, we shall identify N = f1; : : : ; ng as the set
S of states.
Let % denote the ex ante preference relation on X, i.e., for x;y 2 X, x % y means that
the decision maker weakly prefers x to y before she knows the true state. The indi¤erence
and strict preference relations, denoted respectively  and , are dened in the usual way:
x  y if x % y and y % x; x  y if : (y % x). State i 2 N is said to be null if aix  x for
all ai 2 Xi and all x 2 X. Let N denote the set of all nonull states. Strict monotonicity
of % is said to hold if aix  bix for all nonnull state i and all x 2 X and all ai; bi 2 Xi
whenever ai > bi. Then we assume that the following three axioms hold for the ex ante
preference relation % on X:
Axiom EA1. % is a weak order.
Axiom EA2. For all y 2 X, fx 2 X : x % yg and fx 2 X : y % xg are closed in X.
Axiom EA3. % is strictly monotonic.
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It is well known (see Debreu, [4]) that Axioms EA1 and EA2 hold if and only if there exists
a continuous real valued function V on X such that, for all x;y 2 X,
x % y () V (x)  V (y) :
By axiom EA3, V is strictly monotonic in the sense that for nonnull i, V (aix) > V (bix)
whenever ai > bi, and, for null i, V (aix) = V (bix) if x 2 X and ai; bi 2 Xi.
In what follows, if there is an  2 R such that  2 Xi \ Xj for distinct i and j, then
 2 Xi and  2 Xj should be interpreted as distinct numbers. One way to do this may be
that each Xi is replaced by f(; i) :  2 Xig. To avoid such notational complication, we will
understand each Xi as a set of real numbers that are state-contingent to i. Let % be the ex
post strength-of-preference relation which is dened on the set of all pairs of numbers from
any one of product sets Xi Xi for all nonnull i 2 N , i.e., on the setS
i2N
Xi Xi.
Thus, for (xi; yi) 2 Xi  Xi and (zj; wj) 2 Xj  Xj, (xi; yi) % (zj; wj) means that the
degree of preference for xi over yi when state i is true is weakly larger than the degree of
preference for zj over wj when state j is true. This is known as a cross-modality ordering in
psychology literature (see Krantz, et. al., 1971), whose numerical representation is given as
follows: there exist continuous functions vi on Xi for i 2 N such that, for all i; j 2 N, all
(xi; yi) 2 Xi Xi, and all (zj; wj) 2 Xj Xj,
(xi; yi) % (zj; wj) () vi (xi)  vi (yi)  vj (zj)  vj (wj) :
Furthermore, if ui is another continuous function on Xi for i 2 N, which can replace vi in
the representation, then there are numbers  > 0 and i for i 2 N such that ui = vi + i
for i 2 N. For the latter property of vi for i 2 N, we say that vi for i 2 N are unique up
to a similar positive linear transformation (or simply, similar PLT-unique).
The indi¤erence and strict strength-of-preference relations, denoted respectively  and
, are dened in the usual way: for i 2 N, (xi; yi)  (zj; wj) if (xi; yi) % (zj; wj)
and (zj; wj) % (xi; yi); (xi; yi)  (zj; wj) if : ((zj; wj) % (xi; yi)). We assume that the
following topological version of the axioms of the cross-modality ordering holds for the ex
post strength-of-preference relation % on
S
i2N XiXi, which are understood as applying
to all i; j 2 N, all xi; yi; zi 2 Xi, and all x0j; y0j; z0j 2 Xj.
Axiom EP1. % is a weak order.
Axiom EP2. If (xi; yi) %
 
x0j; y
0
j

, then
 
y0j; x
0
j

% (yi; xi).
Axiom EP3. If (xi; yi) %
 
x0j; y
0
j

and (yi; zi) %
 
y0j; z
0
j

, then (xi; zi) %
 
x0j; z
0
j

.
Axiom EP4.

(ai; bi) : (ai; bi) %
 
x0j; y
0
j
	
and

(ai; bi) :
 
x0j; y
0
j

% (ai; bi)
	
are closed
in Xi Xi.
When strength-of-preference (or preference intensity) for outcome xi 2 Xi over yi 2 Xi
is at least as large as strength-of-preference for outcome zj 2 Xj over wj 2 Xj, the ordering
4
judgment would be reversed if the roles of xi and yi in the rst comparison and zj and wj
in the second are exchanged. Axiom EP2 guarantees this requirement. Axiom EP3 says
that comparisons of concatenated strength-of-preferences should preserve the ordering of
the premised comparisons of strength-of-preferences. This clearly holds true if strength-of-
preferences are to be measured as utility di¤erences.
The topological version is indeed stronger than an algebraic version in Krantz et. al.
(1971) who proved the representation by assuming solvability and Archimedean axioms (for
the denitions, see Chapter 4 in Krantz, et. al., 1971) in place of Axiom EP4. Clearly, it
follows from Axioms EP1 and EP4 that there exists a continuous function U on
S
i2N XiXi
such that, for all i; j 2 N, all (xi; yi) 2 Xi Xi, and all (zj; wj) 2 Xj Xj,
(xi; yi) % (zj; wj) () U (xi; yi)  U (zj; wj) :
The solvability and Archimedean axioms readily follow from the continuity of U . Of course,
the role of Axioms EP2 and EP3 is to decompose U into U (xi; yi) = vi (xi)   vi (yi) for
i 2 N.
Finally we note that monotonicity is not imposed here. It is the property induced by the
consistency axiom introduced in the next section.
3 State-Dependent Representation
In this section, we shall assume that ex ante axioms EA1-EA3 for the ex ante preference
relation % on X = X1      Xn and ex post axioms EP1-EP4 for the ex post strength-
of-preference relation % on
S
i2N Xi  Xi hold. Then there exist a strictly monotonic
continuous utility function V on X for % and similar PLT-unique continuous strength-of-
preference functions vi on Xi (i 2 N) for %. At this point, however, nothing can be said
about any relation between V and a set fvi : i 2 Ng.
In what follows, with no loss of generality, we shall assume that N = f1; : : : ;mg for
some 2  m  n. Our goal is to nd a condition which guarantees the existence of a unique
positive probability vector p = (p1; : : : ; pm) 2 Rm such that
Pm
i=1 pi = 1 and, for all x 2 X,
V (x) =
mX
i=1
pivi (xi) :
It follows from the representation that vi for i 2 N are strictly increasing. Furthermore, if
(ai; xi)  (bj; xj) for i; j 2 N, then, for all x 2 X,
aix % bjx () pi  pj:
This says that, for nonnull i and j, if preference intensity for ai over xi is judged to be equal
to preference intensity for bj over xj, then state i is weakly more likely than state j if and
only if act aix is weakly preferred to act bjx.
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A consistency condition between ex ante preference and ex post strength-of-preference
relations that we need is stated as follows, where the axiom is understood as applying to all
x;y; z;w 2 X.
Ex ante-Ex post Consistency Axiom: If x % y and (zi; wi) % (xi; yi) for some
nonnull i 2 N, then zix % wiy. If, in addition, (zi; wi)  (xi; yi), then zix  wiy.
This axiom says that if, for some nonnull i, preference intensity for outcome zi over outcome
wi is larger than or equal to preference intensity for outcome xi over outcome yi, then act
zix should be weakly preferred to act wiy whenever act x is weakly preferred to act y. If,
in addition, the comparison of those preference intensities is strict, then act zix should be
preferred to act wiy. This implies that ex post strength-of-preferences monotonically induce
ex ante preferences. Since ex ante preferences are observable by choices, it would be desirable
if they are induced by ex post strength-of-preferences. This is partially possible, i.e., ex post
strength-of-preferences for the same state can be observed by ex ante preferences. To see
this, we assume that, for i 2 N, aix % biy and dix % ciy. If (ci; di)  (ai; bi), then, by the
consistency axiom, cix  diy, a contradiction. Hence we conclude that (ai; bi) % (ci; di).
When one of aix % biy and dix % ciy is strict, the consistency axiom together with axiom
EP2 implies that (ai; bi)  (ci; di). Unfortunately, however, there seems to be no way to
infer ex post strength-of-preferences for distinct states from ex ante preferences.
An easy implication of the consistency axiom together with monotonicity axiom EA3 is
that, for all i 2 N, vi is strictly increasing. To see this, assume that, for i 2 N, ai > bi
and (bi; ai) % (xi; xi). Then, by the axiom, bix % aix. By axiom EA3, ai > bi implies that
aix  bix. This is a contradiction. Hence ai > bi implies that (ai; bi)  (xi; xi). That is, vi
is strictly increasing.
The representational implication of the ex ante-ex post consistency axiom is given by the
following main theorem.
The Main Theorem. Suppose that N = f1; : : : ;mg  N is the set of nonnull states
with m  2. Then the ex ante-ex post consistency axiom holds if and only if there exists a
unique positive probability vector p 2 Rm such that, for all x; y 2 X,
x % y ()
mX
i=1
pivi (xi) 
mX
i=1
pivi (yi) :
Proof. The necessity of ex ante-ex post consistency easily follows. Thus we show its
su¢ ciency. In what follows, we assume that ex ante-ex post consistency holds. First we note
that ex ante preference relation % satises the following condition, understood as applying
to all i 2 N , all xi; yi; zi; wi 2 Xi, and all a; b; c;d 2 X:
Generalized triple cancellation: If xia % yib, zib % wia, and yic % xid, then
zic % wid.
To prove this, we rst assume that i is null. Since yic % xid, it follows from the denition of
nullity and axiom EA1 that zic % wid. Next, we assume that i 2 N and (wi; zi)  (xi; yi).
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Since xia % yib, the consistency axiom implies that wia  zib, a contradiction. Thus
(xi; yi) % (wi; zi). By axiom EP2, (zi; wi) % (yi; xi). By the consistency axiom, zic % wid.
It was proved by Wakker (1989) that, by axioms EA1 and EA2 together with generalized
triple cancellation, there are similar PLT unique continuous real valued functions fi on Xi
for i = 1; : : : ; n such that, for all x;y 2 X,
x % y ()
nX
i=1
fi (xi) 
nX
i=1
fi (yi) :
Furthermore, fi is constant if i is null. By axiom EA3, fi is strictly increasing if i is nonnull.
In what follows, for i 2 N and all x;y 2 X, dene i (x;y) =
P
j 6=i (fj (xj)  fj (yj)).
First we prove that if i 2 N is nonnull, then, for all (xi; yi) ; (zi; wi) 2 Xi Xi,
(xi; yi) % (zi; wi) () fi (xi)  fi (yi)  fi (zi)  fi (wi) :
To prove this, it su¢ ces to show that, for a nonnull i 2 N , the following two claims are valid:
for all (xi; yi) ; (zi; wi) 2 Xi Xi,
(1) if fi (xi)  fi (yi) > fi (zi)  fi (wi), then (xi; yi)  (zi; wi);
(2) if fi (xi)  fi (yi) = fi (zi)  fi (wi), then (xi; yi)  (zi; wi).
To verify (1), suppose that fi (xi) fi (yi) > fi (zi) fi (wi). We rst assume that there
are a; b 2 X such that
fi (xi)  fi (yi)  i (a; b)  fi (zi)  fi (wi) :
Then
fi (xi) +
X
j 6=i
fj (bj)  fi (yi) +
X
j 6=i
fj (aj) ;
fi (wi) +
X
j 6=i
fj (aj)  fi (zi) +
X
j 6=i
fj (bj) ;
one of which must be strict. Therefore, either xib % yia and wia  zib, or xib  yia
and wia % zib. If xib % yia, wia  zib, and (zi; wi) % (xi; yi), then, by the consistency
axiom, zib % wia, a contradiction. Similarly, assume that xib  yia, wia % zib, and
(zi; wi) % (xi; yi). Then, by axiom EP2, (yi; xi) % (wi; zi). The consistency axiom implies
that yia % xib, a contradiction. Hence, (xi; yi)  (zi; wi).
Next we assume that, for no a; b 2 X,
fi (xi)  fi (yi)  i (a; b)  fi (zi)  fi (wi) :
Since i (a;a) = 0 for all a 2 X, we must have either fi (xi)  fi (yi) > fi (zi)  fi (wi) > 0
or 0 > fi (xi)   fi (yi) > fi (zi)   fi (wi). Assume fi (xi)   fi (yi) > fi (zi)   fi (wi) > 0.
For the other case the proof is similar. Since f1; : : : ; fn are continuous, it is impossible to
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have that i (a; b) > fi (xi)  fi (yi) for some a; b 2 X. To see this, it su¢ ces to notice that
fi (xi)   fi (yi)  i (ta+ (1  t) b; b)  fi (zi)   fi (wi) for some 0 < t < 1. Thus, for all
a; b 2 X,
fi (xi)  fi (yi) > fi (zi)  fi (wi) > i (a; b) :
Let
i = sup fi (a; b) : a; b 2 Xg :
Then i > 0 since some j 6= i is nonnull. Take any positive integer k such that
i >
fi (zi)  fi (wi)
k
:
Hence, for some a0; b0 2 X,
fi (xi)  fi (yi)
k
> i (a
0; b0) >
fi (zi)  fi (wi)
k
:
Since fi is continuous and strictly increasing, there are c1i ; : : : ; c
k
i ; d
1
i ; : : : ; d
k
i 2 Xi such that,
for j = 0; 1; : : : ; k,
fi
 
cji
  fi  cj+1i  = fi (xi)  fi (yi)k ;
fi
 
dji
  fi  dj+1i  = fi (zi)  fi (wi)k ;
where c0i = xi, c
k+1
i = yi, d
0
i = zi, and d
k+1
i = wi. Thus, for j = 0; 1; : : : ; k,
fi
 
cji
  fi  cj+1i  > i (a0; b0) > fi  dji  fi  dj+1i  :
It follows from the preceding paragraph that
 
cji ; c
j+1
i
   dji ; dj+1i  for j = 0; 1; : : : ; k, i.e.,
vi
 
cji
  vi  cj+1i  > vi  dji  vi  dj+1i  :
Summation of these equalities gives vi (c0i ) vi
 
ck+1i

> vi (d
0
i ) vi
 
dk+1i

. Hence, (xi; yi) 
(zi; wi).
To verify (2), suppose that fi (xi)  fi (yi) = fi (zi)  fi (wi). Also, suppose that fi (xi) 
fi (yi)  0. When fi (xi)   fi (yi) < 0, the proof is similar. First, we assume that fi (xi)  
fi (yi)  i (a0; b0) for some a0; b0 2 X. Then, by continuity of fi, fi (xi) fi (yi) = i (a00; b00)
for some a00; b00 2 X, so that xib00  yia00 and zib00  wia00. If (xi; yi)  (zi; wi), then the
consistency axiom implies xib
00  yia00. If (zi; wi)  (xi; yi), then similarly zib00  wia00.
These are contradictions. Hence (xi; yi)  (zi; wi).
Next, we assume that fi (xi)  fi (yi) > i (a; b) for all a; b 2 X. Then fi (xi)  fi (yi) >
i (a
0; b0) > 0 for some a0; b0 2 X. Thus, for some integer k > 0,
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i (a
0; b0)  fi (xi)  fi (yi)
k
.
Therefore, by continuity of fi, there are c1i ; : : : ; c
k
i ; d
1
i ; : : : ; d
k
i 2 Xi such that, for j =
0; 1; : : : ; k,
fi
 
cji
  fi  cj+1i  = fi  dji  fi  dj+1i  = fi (xi)  fi (yi)k ;
where c0i = xi, c
k+1
i = yi, d
0
i = zi, and d
k+1
i = wi. Note that
i (a
00; b00) =
fi (xi)  fi (yi)
k
for some a00; b00 2 X:
Thus it follows from the preceding paragraph that
 
cji ; c
j+1
i
   dji ; dj+1i  for j = 0; 1; : : : ; k,
so that
vi
 
cji
  vi  cj+1i  = vi  dji  vi  dj+1i  :
Adding these equalities, we obtain vi (c0i )   vi
 
ck+1i

= vi (d
0
i )   vi
 
dk+1i

, which implies
(xi; yi)  (zi; wi). This completes the proof of the claims (1) and (2).
If i is nonnull, then, on Xi Xi, we have
(xi; yi) % (zi; wi) () fi (xi)  fi (yi)  fi (zi)  fi (wi)
() vi (xi)  vi (yi)  vi (zi)  vi (wi)
Therefore, fi = ivi+ i for some numbers i > 0 and i. By assumption, N
 = f1; : : : ;mg
is the set of all nunnull states. Thus
Pm
i=1 i > 0. We dene pi = i=
Pm
k=1 k for all i 2 N.
Hence, p = (p1; : : : ; pm) is a unique positive probability vector in Rm and, for all x;y 2 X,
x % y ()
nX
i=1
fi (xi) 
nX
i=1
fi (yi)
()
mX
i=1
fi (xi) 
mX
i=1
fi (yi)
()
mX
i=1
(ivi (xi) + i) 
mX
i=1
(ivi (yi) + i)
()
mX
i=1
pivi (xi) 
mX
i=1
pivi (yi) :
This completes the proof.
9
4 Conclusion
In the subjective expected utility paradigm, this paper considered two primitive preference
relations, i.e. ex ante preference and ex post strength-of-preference relations, whose numer-
ical representations are well known in the literature. The main contribution of the paper
was to discover a consistency condition between ex ante preference and ex post strength-of-
preference relations which can separate utility and unique subjective state probabilities.
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